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Abstract
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum
formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky.
In a dynamic decision context type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated
with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with
individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic
personality types and derive some comparative static results.
"The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche contains more than one
energy system, and that these energy systems have some degree of independence from each others"
(McIntosh 1969)
1 Introduction
Everyone has been confronted with an ambiguous picture. A famous one allows one to either see the
profile of Sigmund Freud’s head or the naked body of a little women. The remarkable thing is that one
cannot see both simultaneously. The two pictures are true but they are incompatible. This reminds
of “Bohr complementarity" in Quantum Physics.1 The complementarity principle states that some
objects have multiple properties that appear to be contradictory. Sometimes it is possible to switch
back and forth between diﬀerent views of an object to observe these properties, but in principle, it is
∗Paris School of Economics, alambert@pse.ens.fr
†Indiana University USA, jbusemey@indiana.edu
1Niels Bohr is one of the founders of Quantum Mechanics. After intense dicussions with Heisenberg and Pauli, he
introduces the fundamental concept of complementarity at the Côme conference in 1927 which was followed by numerous
publications.
1
impossible to view both at the same time, despite their simultaneous existence.2 Similarities between
human sciences and quantum physics were early recognized by the founders of Quantum Mechanics,
including Bohr and Heisenberg.3 In particular Bohr was heavily influenced by the psychology and
philosophy of knowledge of Harald Höﬀding.4 A fundamental similarity stems from the fact that in
both fields the object of investigation cannot (always) be separated from the process of investigation.
Quantum Mechanics and in particular its mathematical formalism was developed to respond to that
epistemological challenge (see the Introduction in [9]). In our view this makes it fully legitimate
to explore the value of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to the study of human
behavioral phenomena.
Under the last decade scholars from social sciences, psychology, physics and mathematics have
contributed to the development of a “quantum-like" decision theory based on the premises of (non-
classical) indeterminacy (see e.g., [19, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 34, 36]). This line of research has shown
itself very fruitful to explain a wide variety of behavioral phenomena ranging from cognitive dissonance
to preferences reversal, the inverse fallacy or the disjunction eﬀect. A central feature of (non-classical)
indeterminacy is, according to G. Mackey ([38]), that it places limitations on the system, “The laws of
quantum mechanics place certain restrictions on the possible simultaneous probability distribution of
various observables" (p. 61). Similarly, indeterminacy in decision theory captures cognitive limitations
of the individual in the following sense. The individual is not simultaneously endowed with a preference
order over all possible subsets of alternatives. Instead, as one elicits the individual’s preferences with
respect to one subset of alternatives (in a choice experiment), his preferences with respect to another
subset of alternatives (associated with an incompatible choice experiment) are modified so behavior
can e.g., exhibit preference reversal.5 This cognitive limitation implies that individual behavior is
boundedly rational in the sense that it is not consistent with the existence of a complete ordering over
the universal set of alternatives.6
The starting point for our approach is that we depart from the classical dogma that individuals
are endowed with preferences and attitudes that motivate their behavior. Instead, we propose that
the motivational underpinning of behavior is intrinsically uncertain, i.e., indeterminate. It is only at
the moment the individual selects an action that a specific type (preferences) is actualized. It is not
merely revealed but rather determined in the sense that prior to the choice, there is an irreducible
2Ambiguous pictures do not feature all characteristics of Bohr complementarity. For a rigorous analysis of quantum
like phenomena in human perception see e.g., [2]. They study oscillations in bi-stable perception of the Necker cube.
3Heisenberg [30] formulates three regions of knowledge depending on the degree of separability between the object
and the process of investigation. The second region corresponds to the case where we have non-separabilities. Heisenberg
puts quantum physics in that region but also psychology and biology.
4Bohr considered introspective psychology not as an illustration but as the paradigmatic description of the episte-
mological limitations in modern physics. [11]
5Preference ordering over diﬀerent subsets may be complementary properties in the sense of Bohr complementarity.
6For a comparison between the behavior of a classical rational man and that of a type indeterminate agent see [36]
Section 3.1.
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multiplicity of potential types. This idea is very much in line with Tversky and Simonson according
to whom “There is a growing body of evidence that supports an alternative conception according
to which preferences are often constructed not merely revealed in the elicitation process. These
constructions are contingent on the framing of the problem, the method of elicitation, and the context
of the choice”(in [33], p. 525—526).
The basic model of static decision-making with Type Indeterminate agents, the TI-model, is for-
mulated in [36]. As we consider dynamic individual optimization, the TI-model induces a game
among potential incarnations of the individual. In each period these potential incarnations represent
conflicting desires or propensities to act. We formulate the decision problem in terms of a game be-
tween a multiplicity of (one-period lived) players, the selves.7 They are linked to each other through
two channels: (i) the selves share a common interests in the utility of the future incarnations of the
individual and (ii) they are connected to each other in a process of state transition (which captures
indeterminacy). In each period the current selves form intentions to act. One action is played by the
individual but the whole profile of (intended) actions matters to tomorrow’s identity by force of the
state transition process. This creates a strategic concern among contemporaneous selves. In partic-
ular when the selves pool, the individual’s preferences are unchanged while if they choose diﬀerent
actions preferences are modified. We define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium among the selves where the
state variable is the individual’s identity. In our model behavior aﬀects future preferences (identity)
and in particular a concern for identity (self-image) arises endogenously because identity determines
future expected utility. Choice behavior exhibits deviations from standard utility maximization. It
is characterized by some extent of self-control: some selves may refrain from short-run gains (and
pool with others) to secure a desirable identity. It can also feature dynamic inconsistency because as
preferences are modified, the choices made by the individual through time are not consistent with a
stable preference order. The model delivers some of the predictions of Benabou and Tirole’ ([6, 7])
in particular regarding the impact of the concern for identity on choice behavior. It also generates
novel predictions. We characterize generic classes of personality/behavior: a little conflicted, weakly
decisive but behaviorally stable character and a highly conflicted, strongly decisive and behaviorally
unstable character.
We recently witnessed a renewed interest among prominent economic theorists for the issue of
self-control and dynamic inconsistency in decision-making (see e.g., [27, 28, 29, 24, 25]). There ex-
ists a significant theoretical literature pioneered by Strotz [45] dealing with various forms of dynamic
inconsistency. A larger share of this literature focuses on inconsistency that arises because the in-
dividual does not discount the future at a constant rate. Some form of myopia is assumed instead
7Although this paper uses elements of the quantum formalism in games, we are not dealing with so-called quantum
games which study how the extension of classical moves to quantum ones can aﬀect the analysis of the game. That
approach consists in changing the strategy space, see for instance [20]. We model a game where the agent is characterized
by (quantum) indeterminate preferences.
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(e.g., quasi-hyperbolic discounting). Another approach to the planning problem, first proposed by
Peleg and Yaari [43], models individual decision-making in terms of multiple selves. Various ways
to model those selves and interaction between them have been investigated. Fudenberg and Levine
[24, 25] develop a dual-self model of self-control with a long-term benevolent patient self and a mul-
tiplicity of impulsive short-term selves. This particular structure allows them to write the game as
a decision problem and they can explain a number of behavioral paradoxes. In the present paper,
we argue that the quantum approach to decision-making oﬀers a suitable framework to the McIn-
tosh’s paradox of self-control because the indeterminacy of individual preferences is equivalent to the
multiplicity of the selves (the potential eigentypes). Our approach contributes to the literature on
self-control by investigating a mechanism of self-control based on identity management that appeals
to (intrinsic) type indeterminacy. The technology for the evolution of identity reflects the dynamics of
state transition under non-classical indeterminacy and individual identity is the equilibrium outcome
of the interaction between the selves. A contribution is to formalize internal conflicts and explain
features of self-management without appealing to time preferences that have been the quasi exclusive
focus of earlier works on dynamic inconsistency. Moreover we can connect to another branch of re-
search related to identity and self-image extensively investigated in psychology (in particular within
self-perception theory, see next section) and more recently in economics see e.g., Benabou and Tirole
[6, 7].
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we expose some motivating puzzles and
argue that our modelling is closely linked to the so called self-perception theory in psychology. Next
we present a general model of dynamic optimization by a type indeterminate agent. We illustrate
main features in an example. We define generic personality types in terms of the fundamentals of the
model and derive some comparative statics results. Finally, we discuss links between our model and
the economic literature on self-control and identity.
Recent interest among prominent economic theorists for the issue of self-control (see e.g., Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001, 2004, 2005), Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2010)), often builds on the intuition that
an individual may be better described by a multiplicity of selves who may have diverging interests
and intentions than as a single piece of coherent intentions. Various ways to model those selves
and interaction between them have recently been investigated. Often they amount to enriching the
standard model by adding short-run impatient selves. In this paper, we argue that the quantum
approach to decision-making provides a suitable framework to the McIntosh’s paradox of self-control
because the indeterminacy of individual preferences precisely means multiplicity of the selves (the
potential eigentypes).
To many people it may appear unmotivated or artificial to turn to Quantum mechanics when
investigating human behavioral phenomena. However, the founders of QM, including Bohr [11] and
Heisenberg [30] early recognized the similarities between the two fields. In particular Bohr was influ-
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enced by the psychology and philosophy of knowledge of Harald Höﬀding. The similarity stems from
the fact that in both fields the object of investigation cannot (always) be separated from the process
of investigation.8 Quantum Mechanics and in particular its mathematical formalism was developped
to respond to that epistemological challenge(see the introduction in [?] for a enlighting presentation).
In the next section we provide an extensive record of the revlevant psychological literature.
Introducing indeterminacy in social sciences and psychology has shown itself very fruitful to explain
a wide variety of behavioral phenomena ranging from cognitive dissonance to preferences reversal, the
inverse fallacy or the disjunction eﬀect. Indeterminacy is formalized in quantum physics, some of
its tools are used in modelling decision-making and to modelling behavior more generally ((see e.g.,
Deutsch (1999), Busemeyer et al. (2006, 2007, 2008), Danilov et al. (2008), Franco (2007), Danilov et
al. (2008), Khrennikov (2010), Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2009)). As soon as we consider dynamic
individual optimization the quantum approach to decision-making opens up for the issue of self-control
or, as we prefer to call it self-management, In contrast with the recent papers on self-control, we can
address these issues without introducing the time dimension but focusing instead on the sequential
character of decision-making. In this paper we propose an introduction to dynamic optimization using
the Type indeterminacy model (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. 2009). The basic assumption will be that
the agent is aware of his type indeterminacy, that is of the way his decisions have impact on his future
type and consequently on future choices and (expected) outcomes. We show that, in a TI-model,
dynamic optimization translates into a game of self-management among multiple selves. Its natural
solution concept is Bayes-Nash equilibrium i.e., a decentralized equilibrium among the selves.
We are used to situations where current decisions aﬀect future decisions. This is the case whenever
the decisions are substitutes or complements. A choice made earlier changes the value of future choices
by making them more valuable when the choices are complements or less valuable when they are
substitutes. The preferences are fixed over time but the endowment changes. The theories of addiction
address the case when a current decision impact on future preferences.9 Generally however, the
decision theoretical literature assumes that preferences are fixed unless a special additional structure
is provided. Yet, these theories fail to explain many phenomena related to action that seems justified
by a concern to aﬀect the player’s own identity or preferences or that of other players. Examples are
8 in the words of Bohr "the impossibility of a sharp separation between the behavior of atomic object and the
interaction with the measuring instruments which serves to define the condition under which the phenomena appears".
In psychology investigating a person’s emotional state aﬀects the state of the person. In social sciences "revealing" one’s
preferences in a choice can aﬀect those preferences: “There is a growing body of evidence that supports an alternative
conception according to which preferences are often constructed — not merely revealed — in the elicitation process. These
constructions are contingent on the framing of the problem, the method of elicitation, and the context of the choice”.
[?] p.525.
9Consuming drugs today makes you more willing to consume tomorrow and you may end up as a drug addict.
Knowing that, a rational agent may refrain from an even small and pleasant consumption today in order not to be
trapped in addiction.
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self-esteem, anticipatory utility, self control.
Closely related to this paper is Benabou Tirole as well as articles by Fudenberg and Levine (2006).
They develop a dual self model of self-control that can explain a large variety of behavioral paradoxes.
In their model there is a long-term benevolent patient self and a multiplicity of impulsive short-
term selves - one per period. This particular structure allows them to write the game as a decision
problem. In contrast, we are dealing with a full-fledged game involving a multiplicity of simultaneous
(symmetric) selves in each period. All selves are equally rational and care about the future expected
utility of the individual. The dual self model is designed to capture the management of impatience and
it has a strong predictive power. Interestingly, both the dual self model and the TI-model can show
that (apparent) dynamic inconsistency may arise as a result of rational self-control. We trust that
the quantum approach has the potential to capture self-management issues reflecting a wide range of
conflicting interests within the individual. We aim at testing its predictive power along a variety of
issues in future research.
2 Motivating Puzzles
The idea that an individual’s choice of action (behavior) determines her inner characteristics (prefer-
ence, attitudes and beliefs) rather than (exclusively) the other way around has been present in people’s
mind throughout history and has been addressed in philosophy, psychology as well as more recently
in economics.
Nevertheless the dominating view in particular in economics, is based on a postulate: individuals
are endowed with an identity (preferences, attitudes and beliefs) that explain their behavior. This
postulate is hard to reconcile with a host of experimental evidence including at the more basic level
of perception. It has long been known that the perception of pain is only partly a function of the
pain stimulus. Zimbardo et al. in [48] demonstrated that individuals who had volunteered to continue
participating in an experiment using painful electric shocks, reported the shocks to be less painful
and were physiologically less responsive than individuals who were given no choice about continuing.
Valins and Ray [46] conducted an experiment where snake-phobic subjects were presented pictures
of snakes and were falsely reported that their heart beat was calm. Subsequently they exhibited
significantly reduced fear for snakes. In another experiment, subject were cued to identify the same
physiological arousal as either anger or euphoria [44]. Cognitive dissonance experiments in e.g., the
Carlsmith and Festinger classical experiment [21] also show how behavior aﬀects attitudes. For a
systematic review of experimental evidences (see [4]). All these evidences led Weick [47] to propose
that: “Attribution and attitudes may follow behavior and not precede it". Similarly Berkowitz [8]
remarks " We generally assume as a matter of course that the human being acts because of the wants
arising from his understanding of the environment. In some cases, the understanding may develop after
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stimuli have evoked the action so that the understanding justifies but does not cause the behavior"
(p. 308).
Psychologists developed several theories to account for these experimental facts. According to
the famous James-Lang theory of emotion, when an emotional event occurs, our behavioral reaction
determines our subjective experience of the event (see [32]). Closely related is self-perception theory.
As expressed by Bem [4] self-perception theory is based on two postulates: 1. “individuals come
to ‘know’ their own attitude and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations
of their own behavior and/or the circumstances in which behavior occurs; 2. Thus the individual is
functionally in the same position as an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon
those same external cues to infer the individual inner state." (p. 2 in [4]). Self-perception theory does
not clearly give up the classical postulate. Nevertheless its own postulates are fully consistent with
the hypothesis of (non-classical) indeterminacy which overturns the classical postulate of pre-existing
identity, attitudes and preferences. With indeterminacy of the inner state, behavior (the action chosen
in a decision situation, see below) shapes the state of preferences/attitude by force of a state transition
process (see next section). Indeterminacy means intrinsic uncertainty about individual identity so the
individual may not know his own attitudes, preferences and beliefs. And as in self-perception theory,
it is by observing his own action that he infers (learns) his state (of beliefs and preferences). While
self-perception theory emphasizes the similitude between outside observation and self observation,
quantum decision theory puts emphasis on the fact that observation is structured. As recognized in
self-perception theory inner states are not accessible without some training and instrument to measure
them. To observe one needs an “appropriate descriptor" ([4] p. 3). Such “descriptor" includes “cues"
that can be manipulated to obtain widely diﬀerent perceptions cf anger versus euphoria above. This is
consistent with the most basic feature of indeterminacy namely that the property of a system does not
pre-exist observation. Therefore diﬀerent measurement instruments may give various incompatible but
equally true accounts of the same state. As we shall see this is also at the heart of the state transition
process and delivers our theory of self-control.
3 The Model
We shall describe the dynamic decision problem as a simple separable dynamic game between the
selves of an individual with the state variable identified as the identity(type) of the individual. The
equilibrium concept we shall be using is that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
The kind of situations we have in mind is a sequence of (at least) two consecutive decision situations
(DS). An example is as follows. Bob has just inherited some money from his aunt and the first decision
is between buying state obligations or risky assets. The second decision situation is between a stay at
home evening or taking his wife to a party. The two situations appeal to diﬀerent but related (in a
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sense to be made clear below) type characteristics: the first DS appeals to his preference toward risk:
cautious (1) risk loving (2). The second decision situation appeals to his attitude toward others:
(1) egoistic versus generous/empathetic (2). An alternative story that brings us closer to Tirole
and Benabou and to the literature on self-control, is to define DS1 as a choice between exercising or
sleeping late. DS2 is a choice between watching a good movie and helping your mother with practical
things. The idea is that both DS involve a choice between tempting (immediate) gratification and
more sophisticated satisfaction.
We next develop the general theory and illustrate it in the above mentioned example.
3.1 The players
In each period the individual faces a Decision Situation (DS)  corresponding to the finite set of
available actions in period  We restrict the one-period players’ strategy set to pure actions. The
possible preferences over the profiles of actions (one action for each self) are denoted by  where
 defines the complete measurement corresponding to –see below. Consider  = {1 2} and
assume that there exists (only) three possible preferences: prefer the action chosen by the other selves
(in case the two others play diﬀerent actions, randomize) or a strict preference for 1 (2) irrespective of
others’ choice.  ∈M whereM is the set of all complete measurements, corresponds to an elicitation
procedure that fully reveals the preferences in  A choice in DS  is a coarse measurement e.g., in
our example the choice of 1 by a self does not allows to distinguish between the pooling type and the
1 dominant action type if at least one of the other selves also choose 1. We refer to the  as the
selves or the “eigentypes" of 10 They are the players of our game.
In each period  the individual is represented by his state or type (we use the terms interchange-
ably), a vector |i ∈ S, where S is a (finite) −dimensional Hilbert space and the bracket |i denotes
a (ket) vector in Dirac’s notation which is standard when dealing with indeterminacy.11 The eigen-
types  of  are associated with the eigenvectors
¯¯® of the operator which form a basis of the
state space The state vector can therefore be expressed as a superposition12: |i =P=1  ¯¯® 
 ∈ R P ¡¢2 = 1 where  are the (potentials) selves relevant to DS  This formulation
means that the individual cannot generally be identified with a single true self. He does not have a
single true preference, instead he is intrinsically “conflicted" which is expressed by the multiplicity
of the potential selves.13 The coeﬃcients  also called amplitude of probability, provides a measure
10An eigentype corresponds to an eigenvalue of the operator.
11The mathematical concept of a Hilbert space generalizes the notion of Euclidean space. Its significance was under-
lined with the realization that it oﬀers one of the best mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics. In short, the
states of a quantum mechanical system are vectors in a certain Hilbert space, the observables are hermitian operators
on that space, and measurements are orthogonal projections
12A superposition is simply a linear combination such that the square of the coeﬃcients sum up to 1.
13 In the human mind conflicting propensities to act co-exist until a choice is made. For instance a person may be
hesistating between two deserts :a chocalate cake or a frozen yogurt. With the actual choice of the frozen yogurt, she
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of the relative strength of potential self , more precisely the square of the coeﬃcient gives the
probability that self  will determine the behavior of the individual in DS . As a special case
we have |i =P  ¯¯® with  = 0  = 2      implying |i = ¯¯1®  In that special case the
individual is, at time  identified with self 1.14 As we shall see below, if the individual preferences
are fully determined in DS  they are by necessity indeterminate in any non compatible DS +1.
We assume throughout the paper that there is common knowledge among the players (selves) about
the current state, the utility function of all players and about the state transition process (see below).
As argued in the introduction, type indeterminacy implies bounded rationality at the individual level
in the sense that individual behavior is not consistent with a well-defined complete ordering over
the universal set of alternatives. As we shall see in the next section, indeterminacy also means that
preferences are unstable. However, we assume that the individual is aware of his own indeterminacy
and act consistently within the corresponding cognitive limitations. This hypothesis is captured in an
assumption of rationality (in a way to be defined below) and common knowledge of rationality at the
level of the selves. We do not pretend that we should always expect such a degree of sophistication
from the side of the selves but our approach is a natural first step
3.2 Indeterminacy: Decision-making as a state transition process
In each period, the selves form intentions to play and eventually one action is taken by the individual.
Decision-making is modelled as the measurement of the preferences (cf. the revelation principle) and it
is associated with a transition process from the initial state and (intended) actions to a new state. The
rules that govern the state transition process reflect the intrinsic indeterminacy of the individual’s type
or preferences. It features the minimal perturbation principle that defines a measurement operation
which is formalized by the von Neumann projection postulate15: if the initial state is |i and the chosen
action is 1 then the new state is the normalized projection of |i onto the eigenspace belonging to
116
Formally, a transition process is a function from the initial state and (intended) actions to a new
state. It can be decomposed into an outcome mapping  : S → ∆ where ∆ is the unit simplex
of actions and a transition mapping  : S → S The first mapping defines the probability for
the possible choices of action when an individual in state |i is confronted with DS . The second
mapping  indicates where the state transits as we confront the individual with DS  and obtain
outcome 
Let the initial state be |i =P  ¯¯®  The standard Hilbert space formulation yields that if
becomes a person capable of resisting the temptation to eat a chocolate cake. This identity can be upset by later choices
however.
14 In that special case the individual’s preferences in  preexist the measurement i.e., the act of choice.
15Or the postulate’s more stringent version defined by Luder.
16We talked about “eigenspace" associated with an eigenvalue “a" of a measurement operator if the eigenvalue is
degenerated i.e., if several linearly independent vectors yield the same outcome of the measurement.
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we, for instance, observe action 1 the state transits onto¯¯+1® =X
=1
0
¯¯® (1)
where 0 = 

()2(∗=)
and
P

¡¢2 ¡∗ = ¢ is the sum over the probabilities for the
selves who pool in choosing  . This is of course equivalent to Bayesian updating i.e., the state
transition seems purely informational. The value of this more general formulation comes when dealing
with a sequence of non-commuting DS  To see that the formal equivalence breaks down, we have
to express
¯¯+1® in terms of ¯¯® where  is the new (non-commuting) measurement in period
 + 1 corresponding to DS +1 and ¯¯® are its eigenvectors The eigenvectors of  also form a
(alternative) basis of the state space. And this is where the earlier mentioned correlations between
selves from diﬀerent periods enter into play. The correlations link the two sets of basis vectors: the
eigenvectors of can be written as linear combinations of the eigenvectors of  with the correlations
as the coeﬃcients of superposition–see below.
These correlations captures the extent of overlap between the states.17 In a classical world all
distinct atomic states are orthogonal. So in a classical world either type characteristics are mutually
exclusive: so for instance Bob is either of the risk-loving type or of the cautious type, or the types
can be combined: Bob can be of the risk-loving type and of the egoistic type. But in the later case,
the type characteristics “risk-loving" is not be a complete characterization i.e., not an atomic state.
The novelty with indeterminacy is that type characteristics can overlap in the sense that they are
non-orthogonal atomic states. For instance, in our example the risk-loving type and the cautious
type are orthogonal but the risk-loving type and the egoistic type are not. Nevertheless, the three
are complete descriptions of the individual i.e., they are atomic states. The risk-loving type overlaps
with the egoistic type. This means that if Bob is of the risk-loving type, there is some probability
that in his second choice he will reveal egoistic preferences (with the complementary probability he
reveals generous preferences) and his type will be modified, he will no longer be of the risk-loving
type. Instead, he will be fully characterized as an egoistic type. And, if tested again with respect to
cautious/risk-loving characteristics, the state will transit again and he may end up as a cautious type.
The correlations are a measure of this overlap.
Let MN denote the basis transformation matrix that links the two non-compatible type character-
istics  and : ¯¯® =P  ¯¯® where  are the elements of the basis transformation matrix
17 In their remarkable book on quantum logic [3], Beltrametti and Cassinelli write “In physics, the expression transition
probability generally refers to dynamical instability. Our use of the term is not directly related to instability rather
we follow von Neuman’s terminology. The transition probability between two states is meant to represent intuitively a
measure of their overlapping. Actual transition from one state to another is triggered by a measurement."
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 =
­
¯¯ ®.18 Substituting into Equation (1) and collecting the terms we write
¯¯+1® =X

ÃX

0
! ¯¯® =X

+1
¯¯®
According to Bohr’s rule the probability for eigentype
¯¯1® (if the agent is confronted with DS
+1 that (coarsely) measures type characteristics ) is
 :  ¡1¯¯ ¯¯+1®¢ =
ÃX

01
!2
(2)
This is a crucial formula that captures the key distinction between the classical and the type
indeterminacy approach. TP is not a conditional probability formula where the 2 are statistical
correlations between the eigentypes at the two stages. The probabilities for the N-eigentypes depend
on the M-eigentypes’ play in  A. When no player chooses the same action, the choice of 
separates out a single player (some ), the sum in parenthesis involves one term only. While when
several players pool in choosing the same action, the term in parenthesis involves several terms. As
a consequence, the probabilities for the diﬀerent players are given by the square of a sum, implying
cross terms called interference eﬀects–and not the sum of squares (as we would have in a classical
setting). Since the amplitudes of probability can be negative numbers, the interference eﬀect may be
negative or positive.
We note that the state transition process is deterministic by the, earlier mentioned, von Neumann’s
postulate which says that under the impact of a measurement a pure state transit into another pure
state. In this paper we are only dealing with pure types. If we observe 1 (as the result of applying
) the state ¯¯® =X


¯¯® transits onto ¯¯+1® =X
=1
0
¯¯® =X

+1
¯¯®
that is
¯¯+1® is a pure state. Yet, predictions on the outcome of (applying) +1 are probabilistic
because of indeterminacy i.e.,
¯¯+1® is a superposed state.
3.3 Utility
When dealing with multiple selves, the question as to how to relate the utility of the selves (here the
players) to that of the individual has no self-given answer.19 We adopt the following definition of the
utility of self (or player)  of playing of  when the − other −period players play a−
() + 
X
=
(+1 ¡a−;  ¯¯  = ¢) (3)
18


 

is a scalar product.
19One reason is that while the selves are incarnations of the same individual, they are short-lived. Another is that
they might not recognize the “legitimacy" of some future possible incarnations. For instance a current compassionate
self may not value the utility of a future spiteful incarnation.
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where  denotes the actual play of the individual.
The utility for  of playing  is made of two terms. The first term is the utility in the
current period evaluated by player . This term only depends on the action chosen by .
The second term is the expected utility of the individual evaluated by the future selves conditional
on  = . The second term depends indirectly on the whole profile of (intended) actions in the
current period through the state transition process +1 (a; ). The next period expected utility is
(+1 (a; )) =P  (|a) ¡+1 (; )¢, where  (|a) are the coeﬃcient of superposition
relevant to the next period  It is the weighted sum of the utility of all the possible resulting types
following a, where the weights are given after updating and expressing the new state according to
TP. The possible resulting states +1 (; ) are expressed in terms of the eigentypes relevant to +1
and the expected utility of period  + 1 is calculated given the optimal choice of eigentypes relevant
in period + 1, e.g.,  
The current action profile only influences tomorrow’s state, the summation term in Equation (3)
can therefore be collapsed into a single term  (+1 (a; )) = P=∗(+1 (a; )) Which is
the expected utility when all future selves in all periods play an equilibrium pure strategy.20
Utility thus writes
(; ) +  (+1
¡
a;  ¯¯  = ¢) (4)
in each period the payoﬀ relevant history of play is captured by the state variable representing the
current state or identity.
The utility function may remind of a Bernoulli function in the following sense. With some proba-
bility the self survives (his preferred action is played by the individual) and with the complementary
probability, he is “out of the game". The formulation in Equation (4) means that he maximizes utility
conditional on surviving. The probability for survival depends on the initial coeﬃcients of superposi-
tion as well as on his own and other selves’s choice. But the selves do not take that into account. The
approach is justified on the following ground: being “out of the game" cannot be valued. The self
seizes to “exist" which is neither good or bad. To put it diﬀerently there is no reason to assume that
selves have a “survival instinct", they are simply mental constructions. A self is defined as rational
when he maximizes his conditional utility which is well-defined for any sequence of DS.
3.4 The Equilibrium
In each period, the current selves move simultaneously. They know the current state resulting from
the previous (actual and intended) play. We have common knowledge among the selves about the
payoﬀ functions of all selves current and future and common knowledge of rationality. The selves’
20For the case when there exist mutiple equilibria, we assume that the current selves share the same beliefs about
which equilibrium is played.
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payoﬀs are functions of the current actions and the current state as defined in the previous section.21
Together this means that we are dealing with a separable dynamic game of complete information and
that it seems most appropriate to restrict ourselves to Markov strategies: a strategy for a self is a
function S →  from the current state to the set of actions available at period . We shall accordingly
focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria.
Definition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game is characterized by ∗ :
∗ = arg max∈ (
; ) + 
X
=+1
∗( ¡a; ¢)
in all periods  = 1      and for all   ∈M  = 1     .
So we see that a self “only" needs to worry about his current utility and the expected utility value
of his action via the resulting type. The equilibrium is found by backward induction in a standard
way.22 The novelty lies in the technology for the state transition process which captures indeterminacy.
So in particular the state variable are the preferences themselves and they evolve in a non-monotonic
way reflecting the dynamics of measurement operations and the correlations between non-commuting
DS.
Remark 1 For the case all DS commute with each other, the model is the one of an individual who
does not initially know his preferences and learns through Bayesian updating as he observes the actions
he takes.
If all DS commute, the state variable evolves through Bayesian updating. The individual eventu-
ally learns who he is and behaves as a classical decision-maker who maximizes discounted expected
utility. In the TI-model, the concern for identity arises exclusively as a consequence of the non-
commutativity of successive DS. The general case is a one where some DS commute and some do not.
We below focus on non-commuting DS which allows us to address the issue of identity management
in each period. But we should keep in mind that the kind of preference instability that we describe
in the next section does not apply within a sequence of commuting DS.
Definition 2 We say that the MPE is characterized by self-control when contemporaneous selves with
conflicting short-run preferences pool to select the same action.
When the action set is suﬃciently rich to fully sort out the preferences, all selves have “conflicting"
preferences with respect to the short-run choice. If the MPE is characterized by pooling, some selves
21Maskin and Tirole [40] develop a general approach to Markov Perfect Equilibrium where strategies may depend on
history in a more elaborate way. A distinguishing feature of a quantum state is that a measurement erases information
about the previous state. Expressed diﬀerently all relevant information for predicting the outcome of any measuremnt
is contained in the current state. The history of the state has no relevance. This feature invites the restriction to simple
Markov strategies.
22Although we know that a MPE exists in mixed strategies (cf theorem 13.1 in [26]), we have no proof of existence
for the case we restrict ourselves to pure strategies as we do here.
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must be exercising self restraint, refraining from immediate reward for the sake of the individual future
utility–this is an instance of self-control. In a standard DS, the set of actions is limited relative to
the possible preferences (because a DS is generally a coarse measurement), we talk about self-control
only when selves with short-run conflicting interest with respect to the DS pool. In the next section
we consider an example where the set of action is suﬃciently rich relative to preferences.
Remark 2 For the special case with  = 0 for all selves in all periods, we are back in the basic
TI-model. There is no self-control. For  6= 0 for some selves in some periods the equilibrium
path of action may exhibit some extent of self-control. The model suggests a classification of individual
traits and behavior as we show below.
For the case the selves are short-sighted (or unaware of the impact of action on the future i.e.,
the case of unsophisticated selves), we are back in the simple decision-making model formulated in
[36]. It has been used to explain behavioral anomalies in decision theory from cognitive dissonance to
framing eﬀect and preference reversal.
The case with  = 1, for all selves in all periods, is interesting because a classical agent would
not face any self-control problem. In contrast, for a type indeterminate decision-maker, the issue of
self management arises because today’s intended actions aﬀect future identity–see example below.
For the case, all but one self in each period are short-sighted ( = 0) we have a model with
the dual structure reminding of Fudenberg and Levine but the means of controlling the behavior are
very diﬀerent (see Discussion section below). We leave to future research the investigation of a type
indeterminate individual with such a dual structure.
4 An Illustrative Example
Bob faces two consecutive non commuting decisions: DS1 with action set {1 2} and DS2 : {1 2}.
The story is as follows. Bob just inherited some money from his aunt. The first decision situation
involves a choice between buying state obligations (1) and risky assets (2). The second DS is
a choice between a stay-at-home evening (1) and taking his wife to a party (2). The relevant
type characteristics to DS1 have two values (eigentypes): cautious (1) risk loving (2). In DS2
the type characteristics has two values as well: (1) egoistic versus generous/empathetic (2). We
have on purpose selected two DS that are independent from each other in the sense that there is no
complementarity or substitutability between the choices in DS1 and DS2.
We below define the utility associated to the diﬀerent choices. An assumption that we make is
that 2 experiences a high utility from 2 while 1 experiences a low utility whatever he chooses. To
put it diﬀerently, it is better for Bob to be of the 2 type. We next provide the classical representation
of the decision problem.
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4.1 Classical optimization
Let us first characterize the set of types. Since both type characteristics each have two values, Bob
may be any of the following four types {11 12 21 22} 
The utility is described by table 1 and 2 below
Tab. 1
1 2
 (1; 11) =  (1; 12) = 4  (2; 11) =  (2; 12) = 2
 (1; 21) =  (1; 22) = 2  (2; 21) =  (2; 22) = 3
,
so only the  value matters for the −choice.
Tab.2
1 2
 (1; 11) =  (1; 21) = 2  (2; 11) =  (2; 21) = 0
(1; 12) = (1; 22) = 1  (2; 12) =  (2; 22) = 8
so here only the  value matters for the −choice.
The tables above give us immediately the optimal choices:
11 → (1 1) 21 → (2 1)
12 → (1 2) 22 → (2 2)
Using the values in table 1 and 2, we note that type 12 achieves the highest total utility of 12.
the lowest utility is achieved by 2123 While Bob knows his type, we do not. We know that "the
population of Bobs" is characterized by the following distribution of types:
11 → 015 21 → 035
12 → 035 22 → 015
.
We note that the distribution of types in the population of Bobs exhibit a statistical correlation
between the  and  type characteristics.
4.2 A TI-Model of Dynamic Optimization
By definition the type characteristics relevant to the first DS1 is   ∈: {1 2}  Subjecting Bob to
the −choice is a measurement of his  characteristics. The outcome of the measurement maybe 1
or 2 and Bobs collapses on an eigentype or the outcome may be null (when both 1 and 2 choose
23Note that we here assume that we can compare the utility of the diﬀerent types of Bob. This goes beyond standard
assumption in economics that preclude inter personal utility comparisons. But is in line with inter personal comparisons
made in the context of social choice theory.
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the same action).24 The type characteristics relevant to DS2 is    ∈ {1 2}  Since the two DS do
not commute we can write
|1i = 1 |1i+ 2 |2i
|2i = 1 |1i+ 2 |2i
where 21 + 22 = 1 = 21 + 22 For the sake of comparison between the two models we let 1 =
2 =
√3 and 2 = 1 =
√7 Bob’s initial type or state is
|i = 1 |1i+ 2 |2i  21 + 22 = 1
with 1 = 2 = √5
When discussing utility in a TI-model one should always be careful. This is because in contrast
with the classical model, there is not one single "true type" who evaluates the utility value of all choice
options. A key assumption is (as in TI-game see Lambert-Mogiliansky 2010) that all the reasoning of
the agent is made at the level of the eigentype who knows his preferences (type), has full knowledge of
the structure of the decision problem and cares about the expected payoﬀ of Bob’s future incarnations
(type). The utility value for the current decision is evaluated by the eigentype who is reasoning. So
for instance when Bob is of type  two reasonings take place. One performed by the 1 eigentype and
one performed by 1 eigentype. The −types evaluate the second decision, using the utility of the type
resulting from the first decision. The utility of a superposed type is the weighted average of the utility
of the eigentypes where the weights are taken to be the square of the coeﬃcient of superposition.25
The utility of the eigentypes are depicted in the table 3 and 4 below
Tab. 3
 (1; 1) = 4  (2; 1) = 2
 (1; 2) = 2  (2; 2) = 3
 and Tab. 4  (1; 1) = 2  (2; 1) = 0
(1; 2) = 1  (2; 2) = 8

As earlier noted Bob in state  performs two (parallel) reasonings. We proceed by backward
induction to note that trivially since the "world ends after DS2", 1 chooses 1 and 2 chooses 2 (as
in the classical model)We also note that:  (1; 1) = 1   (2; 2) = 8 The 2 incarnation of Bob
always experiences higher utility than 1
The TI-model has the structure of a two-stage maximal information26 TI-game as follows. The
set of players is  : {1 2 1 2}  the  have action set {1 2} they play at stage 1. At stage
24More correctly when both our eigentypes choose the same action in DS1, DS1 is a null measuremnt i.e., it does not
allows to distinguish between the eigentypes.
25We note that in the TI-model we cannot escape inter type utility comparison. We must aggregate the utilies over
diﬀerent selves to compute the optimal decisions. However just as in social choice theory there is no unique way of
aggregating individual utility into a social value. We return this issue in the discussion.
26Maximal information TI-game are the non-classical counter-part of classical complete information games. But in a
context of indeterminacy, it is not equivalent to complete information because there is an irreducible uncertainty. It is
impossible to know all the type characteristics with certainty.
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2, it is the   players’ turn, they have action set {1 2}  There is an initial state |i = 1 |1i +
2 |2i  21 + 22 = 1 and correlation between players at diﬀerent stages: |1i = 1 |1i+ 2 |2i and
|2i = 1 |1i+2 |2i  The utility of the players is as described in tables 3 and 4 when accounting for
the players’ concern about future selves. So for a −player, the utility is calculated as the utility from
the choice in DS1 plus the expected utility from the choice in DS2 where expectations are determined
by the choice in DS1 as we shall see below.
The question is how will Bob choose in DS1, or how do his diﬀerent −eigentype or selves choose?
We here need to do some simple equilibrium reasoning.27 Fix the strategy of pure type 1 say he
chooses ”1”28 What is optimal for 2 to choose? If he chooses "2" the resulting type after DS1 is
|2i  The utility, in the first period, associated with the choice of "2" is  (; 2) = 3 In the second
period Bob’s type is |2i = 1 |1i+ 2 |2i which, given what we know about the optimal choice of
1 and 2 yields an expected utility of 21 [ (1; 1) = 1]+22 [ (2; 2) = 8] = 7+8(3) = 31 The
total (for both periods) expected utility from playing "2" for 2 is
 (2; 2) = 3 + 31 = 61
This should be compared with the utility, for 2 of playing "1" in which case he pools with 1 so
the resulting type in the first period is the same as the initial type i.e., |i = 1 |1i + 2 |2i  The
expected utility of playing 1 is  (1; 2) = 2 in the first period plus the expected utility of the second
period. To calculate the latter, we first express the type vector |i in terms of | i eigenvectors:
|i = 1 (1 |1i+ 2 |2i) + 2 (1 |1i+ 2 |2i) = (11 + 11) |1i+ (12 + 22) |2i 
The second period’s expected utility is calculated taking the optimal choice of 1 and 2:¡2121 + 2221 + 21121¢ 1 + ¡2122 + 2222 + 21222¢ 8 = 0959 + 7669 = 8 63
which yields
 (1; 2) = 2 + 8 63 = 10 63   (2; 2) = 3 + 31 = 61
So we see that there is a gain for 2 of preserving the superposition i.e., it is optimal for pure type
2 to forego a unit of utility in DS1 and play 1 (instead of 2 as in the classical model) It can also
be verified that given the play of 2 it is indeed optimal for 1 to choose 1 The solution to dynamic
27Under equilibrium reasoning, an eigentype is viewed as a full valued player. He makes assumption about other
eigentypes’ play at diﬀerence stages and calculate his best reply to the assumed play. Note that no decision is actually
made so no collapse actually takes place. When he finds out what is optimal for him, he checks whether the assumed
play of others is actually optimal for them given his best response. We have an equilibrium when all the eigentypes are
best responding to each others.
28We note that the assumption of "1” is not fully arbitrary since 1 gives a higher utility to 1 than 2 However,
we could just as well have investigated the best reply of 1 after fixing (making assumption) the choice of 2 to 2 See
further below and note 12 for a justification of our choice.
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optimization is an "inner" Bayes-Nash equilibrium where both 1 and 2 to play 129
The interpretation is that Bob’s 2 type understands that buying risky assets appeals to his risk-
loving self which makes him tense. He knows that when he is tense, his egoistic self tends to take over.
So, in particular, in the evening he is very unlikely to feel the desire of pleasing his wife - his thoughts
are simply somewhere else. But Bob also knows that when he is in the empathetic mood i.e., when
he enjoys pleasing his wife and he does it, he always experiences deep happiness. So his risk-loving
self may be willing to forego the thrill of doing a risky business in order to increase the chance for
achieving a higher overall utility.
4.3 Generic Classes of Behavior
The 2 types, two actions and two periods case allows illustrating some basic comparative statics re-
sults. The TI-model invites us to distinguish between two situations characterized by the sign of the
29The equilibrium need not be unique. A similar reasoning could be made for both −type pooling on 2 The inner
game is a coordination game. It make sense to assume that coordination is indeed achieved since all the reasoning
occurs in one single person.
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interference eﬀect applying to the high utility option. Interference eﬀects are the signature of inde-
terminacy. When the individual is in the superposed state
¯¯0® both  eigentypes are simultaneously
present in his mind and they interact. The interference eﬀect captures the impact of the interaction
between the  eigentypes in the determination of the probabilities for the outcome in DS2. The
propensity to be of the type 2 who experiences the high second period utility is present in both 1
(2 |2i) and in 2 (2 |2i) We have positive interference eﬀects when those propensities reinforce
each other and increase the chance that the superposed individual will turn out to be of that type. The
sign of interferences eﬀect depends on the operators associated with the decisions. These operators
and the correlations between them are structural properties of the state space. Our view is that those
properties capture neurological and psychological regularities common to all individuals or at least
a larger group of individual (e.g., from the same sociocultural background). Whether interference
eﬀects are positive or negative is an empirical question.30 While these are features common to all
individuals, each individual is characterized by his state, a vector in a potentially very high dimen-
sional space. Moreover, individuals can diﬀer in the intensity of the utility experienced by their selves
and in the value their selves put on the utility of future incarnations. We next investigate how these
characteristics together with type indeterminacy gives rise to patterns of behavior or “personality
traits".
4.3.1 Self-Control by Inner Agreement
In this section we assume, as in the example, that the interference eﬀect (IE) favors the high utility
option 2 (and automatically reduced the probability for the low utility alternative). As we shall see
a positive IE is a factor that favors behavioral (and intertemporal) consistency. Assume that we have
 (2)   (1)   ¡0¢ (5)
where  () is the expected utility in period 2 when the state is  We recall that the first DS is a
complete measurement of type characteristics 31 so we must have
1 (1)  1 (2) and 2 (1)  2 (2)
i.e., the −selves have conflicting short-run interests.
When considering a sequence of two non-commuting DS, the model distinguishes between two
classes of individuals: the balanced individual, an individual whose selves manage to agree on a
common choice, and the conflicted individual whose selves make separating choice, more precisely:
Definition 3 A balanced individual is characterized by a MPE that is a pooling equilibrium. It obtains
whenever
1 (1) + 1 (1) ≤ 1 (2) + 1
¡0¢ (6)
30This is also the case in Quantum Mechanics.
31This means that when considered in isolation, DS1 separates between the −types.
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or
2 (2) + 2 (2) ≤ 2 (1) + 2
¡0¢ (7)
or both. Otherwise, the individual is conflicted i.e., her inner equilibrium is characterized by separation.
The Equations (6) and (7) capture the selves’ incentives to refrain from choosing their preferred
action (exerting self restraint) given that the other self chooses his preferred first period action. When
an inequality is falsified it is a dominating strategy for that self to choose his preferred first period
action. Since we have a conflict of interest, when neither of them holds, the choices are separating.
This means that if invited to choose, the individual promptly incarnates either one or the other self.
She shows clear-cut preferences, determination. This also means that the first period action triggers
state transition onto one of the eigentypes i.e., identity is modified. As a consequence, behavior
will exhibit inconsistency (e.g., preference reversal). So this suggests that individuals who are quite
extreme in their judgment and have clear-cut preferences also exhibit behavioral inconsistency. The
identity of a conflicted individual jumps from one period to another together with the decision made.
Recall that this applies to non-commuting DS. So in particular in a sequence DS1-DS3-DS1 where DS3
commutes with DS1, an individual that we characterize as conflicted, will not exhibit any behavioral
instability or inconsistencies.
The balanced individual is characterized by selves who are willing to reach an agreement, they
make a pooling choice. This occurs at the expense of one of the selves who chooses to forego his
preferred option in period 1. This is an instance of self-control. The balanced individual has no clear-
cut preferences. we could say that she retains the freedom to value options from diﬀerent perspectives.
The pooling equilibrium obtains when the inequality in (6) or in (7) or both are true. We have pooling
on 1 for the case, at least, Equation (7) holds. When both inequalities hold, we could have pooling on
either action. But since 1 is closer (highly correlated) to 2 and there is agreement on the advantage
of identity 2 it is reasonable to expect pooling on 1 For the case only Equation (6) holds, the MPE
yields pooling on 2 Interestingly, in two of three cases, the pooling MPE yields the “good" action
1 in period 1. But it is not always the case. We may have that the “good" or more forward-looking
self chooses to refrain from his preferred action–when Equation (6) does not hold. This can capture a
situation when the individual feels that being too demanding with herself fires back. In the example,
if the cautious type insists on being cautious, there is a 50% chance that the individual becomes a
risk loving type who will have a high chance to be of the egoistic type which is costly since Bob then
will only get a low second period utility.
A pooling MPE, triggers no state transition. If the selves were pooling in all periods, the individual
would simply behave as a an individual endowed with stable but stochastic preferences. She does not
qualify as behaviorally or dynamically inconsistent.
We would like to emphasize that our model features self-control by means of identity management.
In this respect we stand closer to Benabou Tirole [7]. In particular, we do not address the question
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related to taking actions (commitment) to limit future behavior as in Gul and Pesendorfer [27] and
Fudenberg and Levine [24]. In the next section we briefly return to this question.
Definition 3 allows us to derive some simple comparative statics. For that purpose we write the
inequalities in Definition 3 as follows:  ()−  () ≤ 
£ ¡0¢− ()¤.
4.3.2 Negative Interference Eﬀect: Agreeing to Disagree
Consider the case when
 ()   (2)   (1) (8)
which obtains in the example by inverting the signs of 1 and 2 The selves’ incentives are described
unambiguously by the inequalities
1 (1) + 1 (1)  1 (2) + 1 () (9)
and
2 (2) + 2 (2)  2 (1) + 2 () (10)
This implies that both types prefer separation in DS1. We have a case of “agreement to disagree".
Identity management concerns do not alter the selves’ short-run incentives. In the terms defined in the
previous section we say that with respect to DS linked by negative interference eﬀects, the individual
behaves as a conflicted person whose identity keeps on changing so he exhibits intertemporal and
behavioral inconsistencies.
We thus find that identity management concerns cannot promote self-restraint and consistency
when IE are negative. In such cases, we may like to consider actions that limit future behavior. But
that is outside the scope of the present paper.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the relation between the present work and some of the literature in eco-
nomics. As mentioned in the Introduction, there exists a vast theoretical literature pioneered by Strotz
[45] dealing with various type of time inconsistency. A large share of this literature has focused on
inconsistency that arises because the individual does not discount the future at a constant rate. A
contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that there exists other sources of inner conflict i.e., not
related to time preferences. A type indeterminate individual is in each period characterized by a
multiplicity of conflicting selves (competing desires). All selves are equally rational and care about
the future expected utility of the individual. We formalize the “inner bargaining" formulated by
Ainslie [1] as a sequential game and characterize the circumstances when individual behavior exhibits
preference instability and intertemporal inconsistency. Our approach also diﬀer from the economic
literature on self control in another important respect. We do not consider actions whose primary
objective is self-control like putting one’s money on an account costly to access in order to limit one’s
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spending opportunities. An important contribution of e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer [27] and Fudenberg
and Levine [24] is to provide a rationale for such behavior. The present paper does not address this
issue. One reason is that we may expect a commitment decision to commute with decisions related
to immediate responses to temptations. Those decisions appeal to separate functions in the brain
i.e., higher cognitive functions as opposed to more visceral emotions and desires. If that is the case
which can be established in experiments, some of the reasoning of e.g., Fudenberg and Levine [24]
would simply carry over. From the perspective of indeterminacy, a central question would instead be
related to agenda setting. Indeed, the choice of confronting oneself with a DS about commitment (or
avoiding it) is an important one which has consequences for identity.32
The type indeterminacy approach brings us close to the work by Benabou and Tirole ([5, 6, 7]).
They write “When contemplating choices, they then take into account what kind of a person each
alternative would make them and the desirability of those self-views" ([7], p. 806—807). Further they
write " Two related forms of behavioral instability are history dependence and non-monotonicity.
When a person has been induced to behave prosocially or selfishly, or just provided with signals
presumed to be informative about his morality, his choices in subsequent, unrelated interactions are
significantly aﬀected. Moreover, this reaction sometimes amplifies the original manipulation, and is
sometimes in opposition to it." ([7], p. 810). A common feature to Benabou and Tirole’s approach
and the TI-model is a that today’s’ behavior aﬀects tomorrows’ identity (or self-image) i.e., eﬀective
preferences. With type indeterminacy, individual identity is subject to a state transition process
so future identity is a function of past actions. In Benabou and Tirole the basic mechanism is
incomplete information about own preferences associated with incomplete recall and incomplete self-
control. More precisely, they depart from homo economicus by assuming instead (1) imperfect self-
knowledge; (2) imperfect recall; (3) imperfect willpower. With these three imperfections they can
derive the value of self-esteem (concern for identity), self-monitoring behavior and reconcile with
intertemporal inconsistency in behavior.
As with the postulates of self-perception theory (see Section 2), we argue that the three assumptions
in Benabou and Tirole are in many respects equivalent with giving up the classical dogma of a
pre-existing (deterministic) individual identity and replacing it by indeterminacy. Indeterminacy
implies imperfect knowledge because of intrinsic uncertainty: there does no exist any set of “true
preferences" (to be learned). Instead, an individual is represented by a superposition of potential types.
Indeterminacy implies imperfect recall because no type is the true type forever. The (preference)
state keeps transiting with the action taken so yesterday’s correctly inferred information about oneself
may simply not be valid tomorrow. Indeterminacy implies “imperfect willpower" because it implies
multiple selves both simultaneously (multiplicity of potentials) and dynamically (by force of the non-
commutativity of decision situations). Therefore, there are necessarily conflicting desires and issues
32 It has implications for other decisions that do not commute with the commitment decision.
22
of self-control and self monitoring. Moreover, in a world of indeterminate agents, actions aimed at
shaping one’s identity are fully justified from an instrumental point of view (it determines future
expected utility). In particular there is no need to add any additional concerns for self-image (as in
Benabou and Tirole), or diagnostic utility (as in [10]). The TI-model provides a simple and rigorous
setting relying on one single departure from the standard setting.33 Some of our comparative static
results (see Section 4.3) are similar to those in Benabou and Tirole and consistent with a host of
empirical data including those mentioned in Section 2. Our contribution is to propose an alternative
explanation in terms of a fundamental characteristics of the mind: its intrinsic indeterminacy. Indeed,
we find that the postulate of the existence of a true self that we ignore and keep forgetting about, is
in not very convincing.34
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